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How Israeli strikes are compelling shift in Gulf security thinking

  • Writer: Andreas Krieg
    Andreas Krieg
  • Sep 11
  • 5 min read

The Iranian and Israeli attacks on Qatar in June and September this year, respectively, signify a profound shift in the Gulf's security environment. Longstanding strategic assumptions are being challenged, compelling a re-evaluation of regional threat perceptions—particularly regarding Iran and Israel. [originally published with Amwaj Media]


The Gulf has long been a geo-strategic borderland between east and west, the global north and south. It sits at the crossroads of critical energy supplies, maritime trade and ideological confrontation. Since the eruption of Arab Spring protests in 2011, the Gulf has further developed into an epicenter of international attention and interest.

Developments in recent months point to change in the air. Attacks on Qatar—first by Iran in June and then by Israel this month—signal a profound shift in the security environment of the region. The assaults have shaken the core strategic assumptions on which Gulf Arab states have built their security doctrines for half a century. This is in turn compelling soul-searching at a difficult time for the wider region, with unpredictable ramifications—including differing perceptions of Iran and Israel.

 

Fundamental assumptions

For decades, the core strategic assumption in the Gulf has been that the United States is the ultimate guarantor. Washington has been viewed as indispensable to Gulf security. The American military presence, especially since the 1990-91 Gulf War, has been seen as the ultimate deterrent against external aggression and as the backstop for regime survival.


Hosting American bases, buying American hardware and aligning foreign policy with US interests were considered sufficient to ensure protection. The Iranian and Israeli strikes on Qatari territory now throw this belief into question. In both June and September, the United States did not deter hostile action against its closest Gulf Arab security partner, designated a major non-NATO ally. Silence and inaction have been interpreted not as oversight, but as complicity.


The second assumption by Gulf Arab states was that by embedding themselves deeply in western and especially American structures, they could remain relevant and hedge security dependence. Oil and gas markets were once the primary tool of this entanglement, but since the 2000s, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have increasingly positioned themselves as surrogates of US power projection.


From counterterrorism to regional diplomacy, the Gulf shifted from being a net consumer of US security to a net contributor to American power. The 2020 Abraham Accords, under which Bahrain and the UAE were the first of several Arab states to formalize ties with Israel, represented another layer of this entanglement. Normalization with Israel was seen in Abu Dhabi and Manama as a ticket to relevance in Washington. The Doha strike reveals the limitations of this logic—entanglement has not guaranteed security, nor has it ensured American restraint of Israel.


Shifting threat perceptions

For the past decade, Gulf Arab security thinking has rested on the assumption that while Israel has historically been a threat, it can be privately and quietly courted to ensure its hostility is contained. Iran, meanwhile, has remained as the central adversary, with integration into US-led defense architecture the main bulwark against Tehran. That balance now appears to have shifted.

Once seen as a potential partner under American supervision, Israel is emerging as a free actor—capable of projecting force into the Gulf with impunity. Iran is still perceived as a threat, but at least one whose actions have historically been checked by the west. Israel, meanwhile, appears to enjoy strategic impunity, unconstrained even by its principal ally.


Importantly, US retrenchment has in parallel been assumed to be temporary. Gulf Arab elites hoped that a change in administration or strategic recalibration would restore America’s role as security guarantor. That belief has crumbled. The Gulf now sees US disengagement as permanent.

A transactional Washington—driven by shifting interests rather than solid alliances—offers no guarantees. Donald Trump’s visible weakness in the face of Israeli adventurism is a case in point: the US president failed to protect America’s most important mediator in the region, even as Gulf Arab states have pledged nearly 3.6T USD of investment in the American economy. In effect, today, it is the Gulf that underwrites US power, while Washington fails to underwrite Gulf security.

 

The rise of Gulf autonomy

The Iranian and Israeli attacks on Qatari territory this year are not isolated incidents but watershed moments. They build on the trauma of the 2019 Abqaiq attack; though claimed by Yemen’s Ansarullah movement, that operation was viewed as Iran striking the heart of Saudi oil infrastructure, with the US only putting up a muted response. It was a rude awakening for the Kingdom.


In June this year, Qatar had a similar experience when Washington failed to deter Iran. In September, the Trump administration also failed to deter Israel. To Gulf Arab states, these dynamics are another confirmation that the United States no longer provides credible security guarantees. Worse, Gulf capitals now believe that Washington’s silence effectively endorses Israel’s new grand strategy: going beyond “mowing the lawn” in Gaza to plough the entire region—including friendly Arab states—in pursuit of its self-centered, short-term security interests.


From a Gulf perspective, Israel has become another pariah state—more dangerous than Iran because it operates with western cover. Tehran is sanctioned, constrained and monitored; Tel Aviv is unconstrained and enabled. The sense of betrayal thus runs deep. Gulf Arab states who once saw themselves as net contributors to American power now conclude that the US is a free rider, benefitting from their coffers and diplomatic activism while offering little in return.


These developments are forcing Gulf states, and especially Qatar, to reconsider their own grand strategies. For decades, Qatar pursued a doctrine of proactive neutrality. It has been hosting American bases while maintaining dialogue with Iran; mediating between Israel and Hamas, while also engaging Washington. That strategy has been brutally tested. The lesson now is that neutrality alone does not guarantee protection.

The Gulf Arab states must therefore move towards greater strategic autonomy. This involves developing indigenous deterrence capabilities—including missile defense and retaliatory strike options—so that aggression cannot be cost-free. Moreover, there is a need to strengthen intra-Gulf security cooperation and revive the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) not as a talking shop but as a genuine collective defense arrangement. In addition, there is a need to diversify external partnerships, engaging Europe, Turkey and even India to ensure that US disengagement does not leave a vacuum. Furthermore, neutrality should be framed in multilateral terms, so that Gulf mediation is underwritten by international institutions and a more diverse range of global stakeholders, rather than just American goodwill.


Towards a third pole of stability

Qatar’s role as mediator remains central, but it must now be embedded in a broader security architecture. This new setting must be more resilient and strategically autonomous than the narrative about the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), which Trump half-heartedly advanced in his first 2017-21 presidential term.


The Gulf today finds itself sandwiched between Iran and Israel as two revisionist powers. Both Tehran and Tel Aviv have shown that they are ready and willing to strike Gulf states. The US is no longer a reliable shield. The task ahead is therefore to build a Gulf-led security architecture that forms a third pole of stability. Such an arrangement must rest on Gulf self-reliance, collective defense and strategic partnerships that go far beyond Washington. Only then can Gulf Arab states protect their sovereignty, safeguard their role as a global energy hub and preserve their status as a vital crossroads between east and west.



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© 2024 Dr Andreas Krieg 

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